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 1 
Theorising from the Global Standpoint: Kant and Grotius 
on Original Common Possession of the Earth* 
 
Jakob Huber, LSE 
(j.huber@lse.ac.uk) 
 
Despite political theorists’ increasing attention to questions of global 
concern over the last couple of decades, more systematic reflections on 
what it would mean to theorise globally remain the exception rather than 
the rule. In an intellectual climate where the focus of much work often 
remains firmly on the possible extension and application of values, concepts 
and principles originally developed from within and for the nation-state to 
the world at large, global justice theorists tend to rush to substantive 
conclusions in terms of distributive justice, robust lists of human rights, and 
blueprints for a global institutional order. The aim of this paper is to urge us 
to step back and ask a more fundamental question concerning the way in 
which individuals relate to one another globally. Central to this framework 
is Kant’s conception of original common possession of the earth that I 
reconstruct in conversation with Hugo Grotius’s (superficially similar) 
notion. The aim of this comparison is not only to elucidate how much Kant 
departs from his natural law predecessors. Given that Grotius’s needs-based 
framework very much lines in with contemporary theorist’s tendency to 
reduce issues of global concern to questions of how to divide the world up, 
it also illustrates how appealing an alternative Kant’s global thinking is even 
for current debates. 
The argument proceeds as follows. I start with a sketch of Grotius’s 
conception of common ownership. Bringing in Mathias Risse’s recent 
adaption of this framework, I show how its exclusive concern with 
legitimate distribution – how parts of the global common can be privatised 
by individuals and states – speaks to the ‘distributive paradigm’ 
predominant in current global justice theorising. This clears the way for my 
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turn, in the second section, to Kant’s conception of original common 
possession of the earth, as introduced in the Doctrine of Right. His 
characterisation of common possession as ‘disjunctive’ requires, in the third 
section, a detour into the Critique of Pure Reason, where a view on the 
‘disjunctive’ form of logical judgment and the category of community it 
yields elucidates Kant’s global standpoint. This will allow us, in the final 
section, to draw together how Kant’s understanding of original common 
possession differs from the kind of natural law reasoning that I take much 
of current global justice theorising to resonate with. It is Kant’s radical shift 
in perspective – from an Archimedean ‘view from nowhere’, to a first-
personal standpoint through which agents reflexively recognise their 
systematic interdependence with other agents in a world of limited space – 
that provides him with the more thorough and ultimately convincing global 
standpoint. This standpoint does not come with ready-made solutions to 
shared global problems, but provides a novel and promising perspective 
from which to theorise them. 
 
1. Grotius, Risse and the Distributive Paradigm 
 
The idea of humanity’s original common ownership of the earth – 
ultimately of biblical origin – has a long pedigree in the history of political 
thought. While, starting with Aquinas, the notion was invoked by a large 
array of theorists from diverse traditions, it received its most systematic 
development in the work of early modern thinkers from Grotius to 
Pufendorf and Hobbes. Particularly Hugo Grotius’s conception of original 
common ownership as laid out in De Jure Praedae and De Jure Belli ac Pacis 
turned out seminal not only for the natural law tradition but in fact much of 
the early modern discourse on property (cf. Buckle 1991). It is his account, 
together with Mathias Risse’s recent adoption of it, that I want to sketch in 
this section.  
Like his 17th century contemporaries, Grotius employs the notion of 
original common ownership in order to justify property rights and state 
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boundaries, which he does by presenting them as the result of an (idealised) 
historical process that saw the division of an initially common stock. He 
starts with the assumption that God gave the earth to humans in common 
for the satisfaction of their needs (Grotius 2005: II.2.2.1). This original 
community though is not one of actual joint ownership, but rather a 
‘negative community’ where nothing belongs to anyone (Araujo 2009: 256).  
As part of a natural right to their ‘life, limbs and liberty’ (Grotius 2005: 
I.1.12.1), people are free to take possession of things and use them for the 
satisfaction of their needs. But this restricted right to use what is owned in 
common does not authorise anyone to accumulate objects or exclude others 
from similar use before or after physical possession (Salter 2001: 539). The 
lawful use of things is confined to the immediate usage or consumption of 
what people find growing on the common, grounded in a right of self-
preservation.  
Much of Grotius’s account is then concerned with telling a story of 
how this initial, universal use-right was gradually transformed into a 
scheme of property rights and territorial boundaries. This narrative is 
pervaded by a fundamental ambiguity that arises from Grotius’s notorious 
combination of what he calls ‘a priori’ and ‘a posteriori’ methods (Grotius 
2005: I.1.12.1). While, on the one hand, he offers a narrative of (idealised) 
historical developments drawing on a number of philosophical, literary and 
theological sources, he does so against the assumption that the 
acknowledged facts of human history are not arbitrary or accidental, but 
necessary. Given that human nature so drastically constrains possible 
solutions to given problems that the particular outcomes can be seen to be 
inevitable, history reveals the logic of a distinctively human situation. 
Grotius wants to show that history ‘proofs the existence’ (Grotius 2005: §40) 
of the independently valid laws of nature. In inferring the a priori from the a 
posteriori, the rational history of property becomes its justification – what 
happened ought to have happened.  
The emergence of rights in property and territory figures as part of a 
wider account of the evolution of society. In the course of time, people start 
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to grow discontent with a way of life that merely allows them ‘to feed on the 
spontaneous product of the earth, to dwell in caves, to have the body either 
naked or clothed with the bark of trees or skins of wild animals’ (Grotius 
2005: II.2.2.4). In the process of leaving this relatively simple life, they treat 
more and more objects as if they were bound up with their purposes of 
consumption and thus limited in re-usability. With this transition thus 
emerge more extended forms of exclusion and abstinence – the primitive 
form of use-right is no longer feasible (Salter 2001: 544). As soon as 
community members (publicly) start to recognise this fact, an elementary 
form of private property is underway. The initial act of seizure to satisfy 
bodily needs is treated as grounding a right to recover possession after 
usage. Hence, the need for private ownership arises as a natural response to 
circumstances generated when human beings abandoned their original life 
of primitive simplicity, proceeding through an extension of a right to use 
unclaimed things. 
 The earlier De Jurae Praedae describes this transition from mere use 
to the institutional fact of legitimate property rather vaguely as a mental act 
that is ‘produced by reason’ and ‘retained in mind’ of all parties involved 
(Grotius 2006: Chapter 2 Section 102, see also Araujo 2009: 361/2) leaving it 
unclear who exactly has to recognise the validity of property or how they do 
so. In De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Grotius is more explicit that ownership arises 
‘by a kind of agreement, either expressed, as by division, or implied, as by 
occupation’ (Grotius 2005: II.2.2.5). That is not to say that there was once an 
explicit original agreement about the division of the common stock. Rather, 
private property arises gradually out of a series of many explicit and tacit 
contractual steps between consenting parties. Absent visible objections ‘it is 
to be supposed that all agreed, that whatever each one had taken possession 
of should be his property’ (Grotius 2005: II.2.2.5). The division of movable 
objects (like cattle) is followed by immovable property (like land), 
eventually leading to the drawing of territorial boundaries and the 
formation of states. Yet, even after division, rights in property and territory 
retain a close connection to the original purpose of basic needs satisfaction, 
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as expressed in a right of necessity that sanctions the revival of the primitive 
use right (i.e. taking from the surpluses of property holders) in cases of 
extreme and unavoidable hardship (Grotius 2005: II.2.6.1-4). The 
rightfulness of each co-owner’s share of resources, and each state’s share of 
space, of what was originally a common stock remains conditional upon 
everyone else’s equal ability to satisfy their basic needs. 
The rough outlines of Grotius’s account of humanity’s original 
common ownership of the earth at hand, I now want to look at Mathias 
Risse’s recent revival of the concept (Risse 2012, 2013, 2015), which had fallen 
out of fashion in political philosophy for quite some while. The turn to Risse 
at this point is motivated by the observation that it is in his work that we 
see Grotius’s notion of original common ownership explicitly employed as a 
fundamental conceptual pillar of a theory of global justice.1 Notice that, 
quite strikingly, Grotius himself is not overly interested in questions of 
genuinely global concern, but in justifying particular property holdings and 
state boundaries. Risse instead explicitly identifies a ‘universally acceptable, 
non-parochial standpoint’ (Risse 2013: 22) in Grotius’s needs-based 
framework, a standpoint he takes to be ideally suited to adjudicate an array 
of issues of global concern – including questions of resources, territory, 
immigration and environment. Very much in line with the sentiment of 
contemporary global justice debates, the need to theorise from such a 
standpoint is said to arise from a twofold empirical development: humanity 
is, in a globalised economy, increasingly interconnected, while at the same 
time confronting more and more problems that ‘concern our way of dealing 
with the earth as a whole’ (Risse 2015: 84). Risse’s revival thus allows us to 
connect the Grotian framework to contemporary global justice theorising 
and to show that the former is, in certain regards, very much in line with 
the gist of the latter. 
Risse adopts the overall outlook of the Grotian framework as just 
outlined to a large extent, modifying it in two important respects. First, he 
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 Strictly speaking, the idea of common ownership only provides one of five grounds of 
justice that Risse appeals to in the course of On Global Justice, but without doubts it figures 
crucially in its overall argument and is developed at length. 
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de-historicises the account. His talk of ‘original’ common ownership does 
not aim at an originally actual state of affairs, but seeks to highlight the – 
exclusively normative – sense in which resources and spaces that exist 
independently of human activities might be taken to be owned in a way that 
is prior to the moral claims that individuals or groups have to these 
resources based on, for instance, occupancy or invested labour (Risse 2013: 
8). Second, he secularises Grotius’s account by replacing the appeal to God 
(and His ‘divine gift’) with intuition-based natural rights talk. Risse’s aim is 
to ‘make maximally uncontroversial claims that lead to a universally 
acceptable, non-parochial standpoint to adjudicate question of global reach’ 
(Risse 2013: 8). More specifically, his notion of original common ownership 
draws on the intuitive plausibility of three separate claims (Risse 2012: 
113/4): first, the fact that resources and space are valuable and necessary for 
all human activities to unfold. Second, the (normative) claim that the 
satisfaction of human needs matters morally. And finally, the assumption 
that – given that resources and space have come to exist without human 
interference or achievement – nobody has a claim to them based on 
contribution or personal achievement. These three claims in conjunction 
are supposed to warrant the theoretical starting point that ‘all human 
beings, no matter when and where they were born, are in some sense 
symmetrically located with regard to the earth’s resources and space’ (Risse 
2015: 88) – in a nutshell, they originally own the earth in common.  
There are a number of normative criticisms to be made of Risse’s 
view – most importantly, the fundamental status quo bias towards existing 
entitlements and boundaries inherent to the account, which would above 
all consolidate existing boundaries and distributive patterns. Yet, I want to 
bracket these well-rehearsed arguments here,2 and open up our perspective 
to the broader picture. What this reveals is that Risse’s Grotian framework 
is not so much an outlier rather than indeed representative for much global 
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justice theorising on offer today.3 For, it resonates with the tendency to 
reduce questions of global concern to distributive questions of legitimate 
shares and holdings. The critique of the ‘distributive paradigm’ in justice 
theorising, as prioritizing the recipient-oriented question of ‘who gets what’ 
over a concern with intersubjective relations and structures, is well-
rehearsed with regard to the domestic realm (see e.g. Anderson 1999, 
Scheffler 2003, Young 1990: Ch.1). That it is less familiar from global justice 
debates is surprising,4 given that precisely in this context it seems most 
urgent to attend to those issues that may emanate from substantial 
inequalities of control over biophysical space and resources, but at their 
core are, and need to be theorised qua, deplorable social relations of 
domination and exploitation that they give rise to. The worry is that the 
distributive paradigm is not only oblivious to the power relations 
underlying a particular allocations of goods, but also profoundly unpolitical: 
rather than treating individuals as agents of justice with the authority to 
raise claims and the capacity to create mutually justifiable relations, it tends 
to view them as passive recipients of goods. 
In the Grotian framework this tendency is reflected in a notion of 
original common ownership as expressing a relation between individuals 
and the earth’s resources. This understanding turns the focus away from 
genuine questions of global reach – how individuals relate to each other – to 
questions of legitimate particularization: the conditions under which parts 
of the global common can be privatised and rights to rule over (and to 
exclude other people from entering into) a specific territory allocated. The 
aim inherent to the Grotian framework is to overcome original common 
ownership, while doing so in the right way: in line with and under 
maintenance of the relevant background conditions that allow for 
continued needs-satisfaction of all. Questions of global justice are thus 
essentially truncated to matters of proportionate usage of resources and 
land. For instance, if a country is ‘underusing’ the natural resources located 
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Wollner 2013. 
4
 Notable exceptions are Forst 2013, Young 2006, Ypi 2012: 88/89.  
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on its territory – i.e. its inhabitants have access to more valuable 
‘biophysical space’ than they would be entitled to according to global 
average – then this country is obliged to accept more immigrants, until it 
reaches a point where its inhabitants are using these resources at the 
appropriate level (Risse 2012: Ch.8). Yet, beyond that, any private person 
can legitimately claim objects as theirs and any state can legitimately claim 
a territory as subject to its control.  
The exclusive focus on the ‘usefulness for human purposes of three-
dimensional spaces’ (Risse 2015: 91) thus leaves the Grotian framework 
prone to overlook – or unable to theorise – the ways in which we relate to 
each other independently or at least derivatively of how each our respective 
holdings contributes to our needs satisfaction.5 In putting at the centre 
stage 'our relationship with the planet as a whole’ (Risse 2013: 11) rather than 
our interactions with other individuals, it speaks to a way of theorising that 
reduces questions of global justice to questions of legitimate distribution. 
This leaves us with an impoverished and overly limited vision of global 
relations – a vision that is not only immanent to the Grotian framework, but 
also dominant in the contemporary global justice literature. What I am 
after, instead, is a non-parochial standpoint that actually enables us to find 
mutually justifiable solutions for shared problems. This requires, to put it in 
Risse’s (2012: x) own words, that we take global theorising seriously as a 
genuinely ‘philosophical problem’. It is with this aim in mind that I turn to 
Kant. 
 
 
2. Kant on original common possession 
 
In the last section, I introduced Grotius’s notion of original common 
ownership and raised some doubts regarding its suitability to serve as a 
truly global standpoint of justification. Now, at first sight it is not clear at all 
why and how Kant’s superficially similar concept should do any better in 
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 As Stilz (2014:509) points out, on Risse’s account a poor subsistence farmer in the global 
south would have no claim (beyond a threshold of basic needs) upon a rich citizen of a 
western democracy – regardless of any economic interdependencies and power imbalances. 
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this regard. It is first introduced in his reflections on the possibility of 
property rights in the Doctrine of Right’s section on ‘private right’, more 
specifically in a part that deals with the rightful acquisition of external 
objects. Kant starts by explaining that to acquire something means to ‘bring 
it about […] that it becomes mine’ (DoR 6:258).6 At this point he repeats a 
crucial distinction introduced at the very beginning of the text: all rights, 
Kant had claimed there, are either innate (‘that which belongs to everyone 
by nature, independently of any act that would establish a right’, DoR 6:237) 
or acquired (those rights which I acquire in virtue of an ‘action whereby I 
make something mine’, DoR 6:237). Focusing on the latter, he now further 
explicates that there are two ways of acquiring an object: either by deriving 
it from what belongs to someone else (through an exchange like a contract), 
or – and this will be Kant’s main concern here – by acquiring it originally. 
He then goes on to specify, first, that what is acquired originally is never 
acquisition of what does not belong to anyone (a res nullius), because 
‘possession of an external object can originally be only possession in 
common’ (DoR 6:258).  
Up to this point – what Kant has essentially done in this opening 
paragraph is to provide a condensed version of his account of original 
common possession – the concept is very reminiscent of the natural law 
tradition indeed: introducing it within the context of a justification of 
property rights, Kant seems to suggest that individual acquisition must 
somehow be thought of as derived from what is originally possessed in 
common. It is even more surprising then that we see Kant – apparently 
aware of the resemblance – immediately distancing his own notion from 
that of a ‘primitive community (communio primaeva), which is supposed to 
be instituted in the earliest time of relations of rights among human beings 
and cannot be based on principles but only on history’ (DoR 6:258). It 
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PP (Towards Perpetual Peace), CPR (Critique of Pure Reason), Preparatory DoR 
(Preparatory works to the Doctrine of Right), WOT (What is Orientation in Thinking?), CJ 
(Critique of Judgment).  
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remains to be seen how, in developing his own conception over the 
subsequent paragraphs, Kant substantiates this delimitation that is clearly 
addressed at Grotius (cf. Edwards 1998: 127). 
 Tracing the argumentative steps that follow, we quickly notice that 
indeed something very different must be going on here. Kant starts his 
subsequent analysis of acquisition with a puzzling claim: The ‘first 
acquisition of a thing’, he claims, ‘can only be acquisition of land’ (DoR 
6:261).7 ‘Land’, which refers to ‘all inhabitable ground’, is the ‘substance’ 
upon which all movable external objects depend ‘as inherence’. Hence, he 
follows,  
 
all human beings are originally (i.e. prior to any act of choice that 
establishes a right) in possession of land that is in conformity with 
right, that is, they have a right to be wherever nature or chance 
(apart from their will) has placed them. (DoR 6:262) 
 
Kant specifies two features about this idea of original acquisition of land. 
First, the kind of possession he has in mind is not ownership in the sense of 
private property (something which I can claim as mine regardless of 
whether I am physically connected to it), but mere physical possession or 
occupation. Hence, he is not referring to land in the sense of a fenced-in 
plot of territory – described as ‘residence (sedes), a chosen and therefore an 
acquired lasting possession’ – but merely as ‘habitable ground’ (DoR 6:261). 
Second and more importantly, Kant hastens to add that this kind of 
possession is a ‘possession in common’ (DoR 6:262). This is the case, we are 
told, because  
 
the spherical surface of the earth unites all places on its surface, for if 
its surface were an unbounded plane, people could be so dispersed 
on it that they would not come into any community with one 
another, and community would not then be a necessary result of 
their existence on the earth. (DoR 6:262) 
 
Two aspects of this puzzling line of argument are striking. First, while Kant 
                                                     
7
 I explore the concept of original acquisition of land and the ensuing ‘right to be 
somewhere’ in more depth in my ‘Cosmopolitanism for Earth Dwellers: Kant on the Right 
to be Somewhere’, forthcoming in Kantian Review 22(1), 2017. 
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articulates a concern that arises from human beings’ embodied nature, this 
concern seems to be very different to that of Grotius: Kant’s concern is with 
the kind of systematic interdependence relations that persist among 
embodied agents just in virtue of the fact that they act and coexist in finite 
space. Such agents of course need to be somewhere – they need a place on 
earth in order to act at all. Yet, they are very different from (Grotian) needy 
beings that share a world of limited resources with beings that have similar 
needs, for the satisfaction of which they have to use, occupy and 
appropriate goods. After all, and in line with the nature of Kant’s practical 
philosophy as a whole, the moral domain of ‘right’ sets out to provide a 
formal account of the ‘external and indeed practical relation of one person 
to another, insofar as their actions, as deeds, can have (direct or indirect) 
influence on each other’ (DoR 6:230).  
Second, Kant seems to reverse the argumentative sequence as we 
know it from the natural law tradition (Flikschuh 2000: 153, 163). While we 
saw Grotius (and following him, Risse) starting with the idea of a common 
stock in order to subsequently divide it up in accordance with a 
predetermined distributive principle, the Doctrine of Right proceeds from 
unilateral acquisition of land to the idea of original possession in common. 
Original common possession is not an argumentative starting point, but the 
conclusion of the argument: something like a normative implication of the 
fact of individuals’ acquisition of land under circumstances of spatial 
constraint constituted by the earth’s spherical surface.  
To sum up, Kant introduces original common possession in order to 
illustrate the way in which embodied agents that jointly inhabit a bounded 
territory are united in an original community. Yet beyond that, the 
pertinent passage does not lead us very far in elucidating the concept. It 
remains mysterious of what kind precisely this community is, or why it is 
presented as the argument’s conclusion rather than its starting point. What 
does indeed come across is that Kant operates with a more formal notion 
than the natural law tradition: the sense in which the original community 
takes the form of an ‘original community of land’ (DoR 6:262) is not that of 
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a resource repository for everybody’s needs satisfaction – what he is saying 
is that the earth’s spherical surface constitutes the unavoidable conditions 
of (potential) interaction. Kant is less interested in rightful entitlements to 
this or that piece of land, resource, or object. Instead, he is interested in the 
way in which human beings stand, from the beginning, in a relation of 
‘possible physical interaction’ (DoR 6:352) with everyone else globally given 
that, as physically embodied beings, they are constrained to occupy a 
portion of space on the earth (which cannot simultaneously be occupied by 
anyone else). In line with this thought, he repeatedly calls his conception of 
original common possession ‘disjunctive’ (Preparatory DoR AA23:321, 322, 
323). It is this notion of ‘disjunction’, I want to claim, which is key to 
understanding the precise nature of Kant’s original community of 
possession.8 Given that it is a term with structural significance in Kant’s 
philosophical system, its further elucidation requires a detour to his 
theoretical philosophy. 
 
3. Disjunctive judgment and original community 
 
In the last section, we got a first impression of Kant’s conception of original 
common possession as laid out in the context of the Doctrine of Right’s 
passage on ‘original acquisition of land’. The present section seeks to further 
deepen our understanding, drawing on Kant’s characterisation of original 
community as ‘disjunctive’. The notion of a ‘disjunctive community’ is a 
technical term that Kant develops in the Critique of Pure Reason, where it is 
introduced in the course of a wider (and perennially contested) argument 
about the nature of space, objects, temporal relations and the unity of 
experience. While it would go well beyond the scope of this paper to try to 
elucidate every single claim that Kant makes in this context, we do need to 
keep in mind one of the most important tenets of the Critique of Pure 
Reason as a whole: human beings’ knowledge of the world depends on a 
system of fundamental categories or what he calls “pure concepts of the 
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 The similarity between disjunctive community and the disjunctive judgment has also 
been explicated by Milstein (2013), whose work has been of great use to me. 
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understanding”. Controversially, Kant thinks that he can develop these 
categories from nothing more than logical forms of judgment expressed in a 
systematic ‘table’ (CPR A70/B95). After all, that is what the human intellect 
fundamentally is for Kant: a capacity to form judgments (CPR A69/B94, 
A81/B106).  
One of these forms of judgment is the ‘disjunctive judgment’, the 
exclusionary ‘either…or’ (CPR A73/B99). In a disjunctive judgment one 
divides a concept A into its mutually exclusive specifications B, C, and D. 
The assertion of any of these specifications of A is then considered a 
sufficient condition for negating the others (if A is B, it cannot be C or D), 
and conversely the negation of all but one is a sufficient condition for 
asserting the remaining one. What is important to understand here is that 
the disjunctive form of judgment divides a logical space (the extension of a 
concept) into mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive spheres. The known 
constituents mutually exclude each other (they are logically opposed to one 
another) but together exhaust all of the logical possibility, i.e. they 
‘determine in their totality the true knowledge’ (CPR A74, see also Watkins 
2011: 44). Thus, there is a sense in which the state of each is bound to the 
others: the affirmation of one member implies the negation of the others, 
and the negation of all members but one implies the affirmation of the 
remaining member. A disjunctive judgement, that is to say, relates all 
concept subordination to a unified logical space within which concepts 
reciprocally delimit each other’s sphere and meaning.  
As already mentioned, the logical forms of judgment then ground 
categories or ‘pure concepts of the understanding’. The idea is that the same 
acts of mind that generate the forms of judgment also generate the 
synthesis of spatiotemporal manifolds under concepts.9 The disjunctive 
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 It is perennially contested among interpreters what kind of connection between forms of 
judgment and categories Kant has exactly in mind there. Longuenesse (2005: 194ff). 
emphasises that in order to avoid the Leibnizean rationalism that he rejects in the 
‘Amphiboly’ section, Kant cannot assimilate a logical relation between concepts and a 
material relation between things. Watkins (2005) agrees that when Kant talks about ‘the 
same procedure of the understanding’ (CPR B113) that underlies judgment and the use of 
categories, he does not in any straightforward way derive one from the other but merely 
points out a similarity among the respective mental acts. 
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judgment yields the category of ‘community’ as the third category of 
‘relation’, alongside ‘substance’ and ‘causality’ (CPR A80/B106, B110-11). Just 
as in a disjunctive judgment, the argument goes, a concept is divided up 
into its constituent components (bringing them into a relation of mutual 
determination and exclusion), so in a material whole, things mutually 
determine one another in an object or body considered as a whole (CPR 
B112/3). In both, members are represented as reciprocally coordinated with 
one another as parts that come together to constitute a whole. Just as two 
logically opposing propositions exclude each other, so two objects cannot 
occupy the same spatial position (at the same time). And just as the 
constituents of a disjunctive judgment, taken together, include the entire 
sphere of knowledge in that particular domain, so substances, in order to be 
an object of experience, must stand in a unified space, a whole that is the 
product of its various constituents. Consequently, the category of 
community has two names: ‘Reciprocity’ (with an emphasis is on the 
relation of causal interaction) and ‘Community’ (with an the emphasis on 
objects’ being part of one space). 
In order to elucidate this surprising connection that Kant stipulates, 
between the understanding’s representation of relations among concepts 
and empirically given things in space, we need to have a closer look at the 
first Critique’s section on the ‘Analogies’ (CPR A 177-218, B 218-265). There, 
Kant tries to show how precisely the categories of relation provide the 
human understanding with ‘schemata’ through which we synthesize the 
manifold of appearances into an intelligible horizon of spatiotemporality. 
Each Analogy looks into how a specific category constitutes the condition of 
a particular type of temporal experience. In the third Analogy (CPR 
A211/B257), Kant claims that we can only experience appearances as co-
existing simultaneously by applying the concept of community.10 This, in 
turn, is to suppose that the objects are in relations of mutual interaction – 
                                                     
10
 For extensive treatments of the third Analogy (which was for a long time neglected in 
Kant scholarship), see Watkins 2005: 217-229, Longuenesse 2005: Ch.7, and Shell: 1996: 
Ch.6. 
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they ‘reciprocally contain the ground of the determination’ of the other 
(CPR B258).  
But why would that be the case? It seems that I can just look at my 
chair, then look at the table standing next to it and I simply know without 
further ado that they co-exist simultaneously. Yet, Kant does not think it is 
that easy, for while we always apprehend objects successively (we see one 
object first, then the other) we have no given (absolute) temporal 
framework within which we might locate events and states of affairs in 
time. Hence, we need the help of the categories that relate the perception of 
objects in time ‘prior to all experience, and indeed make it possible’ (CPR 
A177/B219). For instance, if we look at the desk first and then at the chair, 
we can only judge that they exist simultaneously (instead of being two 
perceptions following onto each other) if we could reverse the perception, 
that is look at the chair first and then at the table (CPR A211). But we can 
only make that judgment under the supposition that each object occupies 
part of a larger unified space. So the sense in which simultaneously existing 
objects stand in ‘dynamical community’ (CPR A213) and determine certain 
features of each other is in fact spatial:11 one substance is thought to be the 
cause of certain determinations in another and vice-versa insofar as each is 
in some sense responsible for the spatial position of the other. If two things 
exist simultaneously, they mutually exclude each other, as each object has 
its place by virtue of the place of everything else. And as only spatially 
separated objects are capable of coexisting simultaneously, spatial positions 
condition temporal positions. To sum up, we cannot locate particular 
objects vis-à-vis one another without first being able to comprehend them 
as coordinate participants in a unified horizon of possible experience. 
This enlightening comparison already leads us some way in 
understanding what Kant seeks to suggest by calling the original 
community of possession ‘disjunctive’. His original community describes a 
system of mutual exclusion where persons stand in a relation of ‘possible 
physical interaction’ in virtue of occupying different parts of the earth. Just 
                                                     
11
 The spatial dimension of the third Analogy is emphasised by Morrison 1998. 
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as a disjunctive judgement relates mutually exclusive concepts to a unified 
logical space, so the idea of a disjunctive community elucidates how in 
virtue of sharing the earth in common, we each affect one another. Yet, in 
order to fully exploit and appreciate the significance of the notion of 
disjunction and the pertinent category, we have to go a step further. 
Following Beatrice Longuenesse (1998: 375-394, 2005: 183-211), we need to 
notice that what makes the category of community so interesting and 
indeed unique among the categories: the perception of spatiotemporal 
simultaneity does not merely require us to perceive interaction among the 
things we observe – it also requires us to posit ourselves within that 
interaction as phenomenal bodies that coexist among them. Kant takes our 
body to mediate our perception of the simultaneous existence of other 
substances: we can only experience substances as standing in relations of 
community under the condition of experiencing them as coexisting with 
our own body (CPR A213/B260, see also Longuenesse 1998: 391). A change of 
our own location is only noticeable through its altered relation to other 
objects (and the other way round).  
Kant illustrates this idea particularly nicely in his (little-known) essay 
What is Orientation in Thinking. There, he develops his stance with regard 
to the wider philosophical issue of ‘orientation in thinking’ (pertaining to 
the scope of reason and the existence of God) by way of a comparison with 
two more familiar and seemingly manageable forms of orientation. First, he 
reflects on the possibility of geographical orientation (WOT 8:134/5). At 
first sight, it may look as though we are able to orient ourselves in a 
landscape by drawing on certain objects or fixed points – the altitude of the 
sun, the position of the stars or a compass. Yet, Kant thinks the idea that we 
could merely orient ourselves drawing on external things misleading. 
Instead, the most immediate (and important) point of orientation is in fact 
our own subjective feeling of left and right, which we (implicitly) rely on 
when distinguishing South, North, East and West. Without this ‘feeling of a 
difference in my own subject’ (WOT 8:134) we would be ignorant of the 
relation in which we ourselves stand to the world surrounding us and thus 
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remain entirely disoriented. This becomes even clearer when we imagine 
ourselves attempting to find our way around in a pitch-dark room (WOT 8: 
136/7). Given that we are familiar with the room’s general lay-out, all we 
require in order to spatially locate all items in the room is knowledge of the 
position of one piece of furniture together with – importantly – our feeling 
for left and right. If instead somebody had rearranged the furniture, we 
would be completely lost. In both examples, it is a subjective feeling that 
serves as a relevant point of orientation in space. More specifically, it is my 
body – its location in space – that provides the necessary reference point: 
the subjective feeling of left and right is nothing else than a ‘feeling of a 
difference between my two sides’ (WOT 8:137). We can only grasp space 
through our own position in it. 
Now, Longuenesse argues that by requiring us to locate ourselves in 
the world, the category of community provides us with what she calls a 
‘standpoint on the whole’: a reflexive standpoint from which we locate and 
situate ourselves in interaction with the world surrounding us. It is this 
standpoint on the whole, I want to suggest, that can be read as providing 
the template for Kant’s global standpoint.12 In order to see this, notice that 
Kant takes reasoning in general to be an inherently shared task (O’Neill 
1989: 9). To use one’s reason ‘means no more than to ask oneself, whenever 
one is supposed to assume something, whether one could find it feasible to 
make the ground or the rule on which one assumes it into a universal 
principle for the use of reason’ (WOT 8:146 fn.). One of the core principles 
of enlightenment, Kant repeatedly tells us, is to think for oneself while also 
‘putting [oneself] into the standpoint of others’ (CJ 5:295).13 Importantly, to 
reflect on one’s own judgment from such a universal standpoint does not 
mean to take up some Archimedean view ‘from nowhere’ – a standpoint 
that is, from the perspective of Kant’s critical philosophy, constitutively 
unavailable and philosophically futile. It means, instead, to shift one’s own 
ground to the standpoint of the others and make it accessible and thus 
                                                     
12
 Here I follow Milstein (2013: 124). 
13
 In a similar vein we can read Kant’s invocation of a genuine public use of reason as 
seeking to address all ‘citizens of the world’ (WOT 8:37). 
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oneself accountable to them. Absent a transcendent standard, reasoned 
thinking can only discipline itself (CPR A738/B766, see also O’Neill 1989: 57) 
– not only by genuinely attempting to judge for itself (i.e. regarding oneself 
as the author of one’s thoughts), but also by exposing one’s judgments to 
the ‘collective reason of mankind’ (CJ 5:293). In the Critique of Judgment (CJ 
5:293), Kant calls this capacity to think from the standpoint of everyone else 
our ‘communal sense’ (Gemeinsinn): the capacity to use our understanding 
in order to develop a common standpoint on the whole, but one that is 
premised on each of the particular (yet reflexive) standpoints we initially 
hold.  
Of course, we need to keep in mind that ‘thinking’ in line with the 
idea of a disjunctive interpretation of the earth’s surface is not completely 
identical with ‘theorising’ from a global standpoint. 14  It would be 
implausible and unhelpful to suggest that orientation and theory fall 
together. Rather, to theorise from the global standpoint is to employ the 
idea of disjunctive community as a model, and to do so with a critical 
intent: to reflect on (the validity of) ways of orienting and their conditions 
of possibility. 
 
 
 
4. Theorising from the global standpoint: Kant vs. Grotius 
 
With our analysis of Kant’s original community as ‘disjunctive’ at hand, we 
can now sharpen the contrast with the Grotian framework. I will start by 
carving out what distinguishes the two conceptions on a substantive level, 
subsequently turning to their role in the respective broader argumentative 
structure. This contrast will provide us with the contours of an alternative 
model of theorising based on Kant’s conception of original common 
possession. 
On a conceptual level, an essential contrast has emerged over the last 
three sections between Grotius’s material, needs-based principle for the 
                                                     
14
 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for urging me to clarify this. 
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division of the common stock of resources and land on the one hand, and 
Kant’s formal argument pointing out relations of interdependence that 
obtain among individuals globally in virtue of their unavoidable coexistence 
on the earth, on the other hand. In both arguments, human physicality 
grounds the idea of original common possession, yet in very different ways. 
Grotius seeks to provide a legitimacy criterion for rightful appropriation of 
land and resources grounded in the satisfaction human bodily needs. In 
Kant, embodiment comes in as a mere precondition for a particular kind of 
moral agency (‘Willkür’, i.e. our capacity for choice and action), a formal 
account of which the Doctrine of Right sets out to provide.  
The ensuing contrast is nicely elucidated by drawing a distinction 
between Grotian relations of ownership and a Kantian relation of wills of 
individuals, a difference Kant himself most clearly articulates in the 
preparatory works for the Doctrine of Right: there, he clarifies that the 
relation between original common owners is not ‘a relation to the land (as 
an external thing) but to other humans in so far as they are simultaneously 
on the same surface’ (Preparatory DoR AA23:322). This of course makes for 
a stark contrast to the Grotian model, which Risse takes to provide an 
explicitly ‘nonrelational’ (Risse 2012: 89) ground of justice. For Kant instead, 
to say that the earth constitutes the basis of possible physical interaction 
just is to make a claim about how individuals relate to one another globally. 
Of course, this is a ‘relationalism’ in the thinnest possible sense, based on a 
mere relation of  ‘possible physical interaction’ (DoR 6:352).15 There remains 
a non-trivial contrast, however, between what are fundamentally different 
ways of conceiving of the idea of original common possession as capturing 
either a relation between human agents and the external world, or a 
relation among human agents. 
Of course, in depicting a mere form of relations of choices between 
subjects, such a conception does not lend itself to substantive implications 
                                                     
15
 I concede that Risse operates with a more substantive, distinctly practical ‘relationalism’, 
according to which what I vindicate here as Kant’s conception may be categorised by Risse 
as a ‘non-relational’ principle, i.e. one that ‘appl[ies] among all human beings regardless of 
what relations they share’ (Risse 2012: 7). I am grateful to an anonymous referee for 
pressing me on this. 
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of the kind we can get out of the Grotian understanding of common 
ownership. Following the latter, natural law already inheres a principle of 
just distribution: the principle of need as determined by human nature and 
discerned by reason. On the Kantian picture in contrast it is, in a way, all up 
to humans: it is them who have to come to terms with the fact that they 
have to share the earth in common, by negotiating terms of coexistence.  
What the idea of original common possession points out is the fact that, 
and the way in which, their fates are inevitable bound up with one another. 
It merely provides a standpoint from which individuals can think and act 
globally in order to find shared solution for shared problems. 
With regard to the broader argumentative structure, we have already 
noticed that original common ownership occupies contrasting places in the 
respective justificatory sequence. Grotius starts with original community 
conceived of as a historically real state of affairs and proceeds from there – 
embedded within a wider account of societal evolution – via distribution in 
accordance with a principle that derives its validity from the structure of 
human nature, to individual property and territorial boundaries. Risse 
replaces the historical narrative with an appeal to secularized natural rights 
reasoning. What renders the assumption of humanity’s collective ownership 
of the earth intuitively plausible is the mere insight that that there is 
something all humans need (space and resources) but which none of them 
can make a prior claim to, for instance based on individual achievement or 
labour. Yet, he does abide by Grotius’s argumentative sequence: original 
common ownership figures as a conceptual starting point from which a 
distributive rationale unfolds.  
We saw Kant turning this sequence upside down: he starts from the 
insight into the conundrum of original acquisition of land, from which the 
need to think of the earth as possessed in common follows as a normative 
implication (Flikschuh 2000: 168). The reason original acquisition of land 
does pose a conundrum for Kant is that, despite the fact that we cannot be 
blamed for the ‘sheer facticity of our placement, willy-nilly, on the surface 
of the earth’ (Shell 1996: 150), it is not without normative consequences. For, 
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given that the earth’s spherical surface makes it physically impossible for 
human beings to get out of each other’s ways once and for all, where and 
how we pursue our ends necessarily impacts where and how others can do 
so – quite simply because the space we take up at every particular point in 
time cannot be taken up by another person (recall my analysis of original 
community as a system of mutual exclusion). Hence, our own right to a 
place on earth comes with strings attached: to conceive of our own 
legitimate possession of a place as a ‘possession in common’ (DoR 6:258) 
with all others. To think of the earth as possessed in common, that is to say, 
is an a priori necessary condition of the unavoidable first acquisition due to 
one’s coming into the world as an embodied agent. Kant employs the idea 
of original common possession of the earth to visually express what it 
means to exist as an embodied moral agent, together with other such 
agents, within limited space. But it would be a misnomer to say that this 
fact just makes it the case that we possess the earth in common. Rather, 
original common possession is something we judge to be the case, 
reflexively acknowledging the need, and at the same time our ability, to 
come to terms with the plurality of perspectives that humans bring to bear 
on each other on the earth’s spherical surface.  
It should now be plainly in sight that Kant wants to ask a more basic 
question than Grotius. The aim of the Grotian framework – and this is 
where it colludes with much of contemporary global justice theorising – is 
to explain or vindicate the individual distribution of what was originally 
given to all in common. Above, I have voiced my worries about the way in 
which this focus on questions of legitimate privatization are prone to losing 
sight of vital questions of genuinely global concern. Kant is not primarily 
interested in how to divide up the world. He uses the idea of original 
common possession in order to explore the most fundamental way in which 
individuals relate to one another globally – independent or at least 
derivative of the ways in which each of us relate to biophysical space. In 
bringing together some of the main points of my discussion, let me close by 
highlighting two ways in which Kant’s conception of original common 
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possession can actually inform (and to some extent, transform) the way in 
which we theorise globally, even without providing ready-made principles 
or institutional blueprints for the regulation of global coexistence. 
The reflexive function. I have reconstructed the disjunctive 
community of original possession as elucidating how we each affect one 
another while being able to reflexively relate to the ‘whole’ of human 
beings. The shift in perspective underlying this model is radical indeed: 
Kant’s global standpoint is not a pre-established view from nowhere, a 
god’s-eye perspective from which goods are allocated. Rather it is a 
reflexive, first-personal standpoint the thinker constructs by shifting her 
ground to the standpoint of the other. To think of the earth as possessed in 
common illustrates the requirement, directed at each particular agent, to 
take a reflexive stance towards their own existence as an embodied agent in 
a world of limited space. It is a standpoint through which we acknowledge 
our ability to locate ourselves vis-à-vis everyone else, and from which we act 
and interact with others with the aim of negotiating justifiable terms of 
coexistence. Rather than treating them as passive recipient of goods, this 
model empowers individuals to see themselves and each other as agents of 
justice that can come together in order to settle the terms of interaction as 
free and rational beings. What it articulates is a specific task, namely to 
come to terms with their unavoidable coexistence on the earth by 
transforming the disjunctive community of possession into to a self-
determining community of mutual participation. While Kant’s notion of 
original common possession, as I have presented it, is thus first and 
foremost an attempt in fundamentally reconceiving the nature of a 
problem, it does constrain possible solutions. 
The critical function. Kant’s model not only encapsulates an original 
way of framing the question or challenge of global coexistence. As I have 
intimated at the end of the preceding section, it also functions as a critical 
tool – a standpoint, that is to say, from which we can assess and critically 
reflect upon existing institutions and terms of interaction that govern 
relations among individuals and communities, and work towards modifying 
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them. In order to illustrate this point, let me go back once more to the third 
Analogy. In the course of discussing the category of community, Kant 
identifies an ambiguity in the word community (Gemeinschaft) as used in 
common language, which he seeks to resolve with a distinction between the 
two Latin terms ‘communio’ and ‘commercium’ (CPR A213/B260). 
‘Communio’ describes what Kant calls a ‘local community’ (CPR A213/B260), 
a set of items that belong together under some given criterion of 
commonality that demarcates those who belong from those who do not (cf. 
Milstein 2013: 122). The category of community, instead, is defined as 
‘commercium’, a community characterised by mere interaction and 
reciprocal influence. Kant makes it clear that community as ‘communio’ 
presupposes community as ‘commercium’ (CPR A214/B261): without the 
dynamic reciprocal influence of substances in ‘commercium’ there could be 
no empirical relation of co-existence or ‘communio’. For, in line with our 
reconstruction in the preceding section, we can only mentally divide a 
larger entity into smaller units thanks to our ability to experience all the 
constituent parts as coming to us already interconnected in a unified 
horizon of possible experience. 
In the Doctrine of Right, Kant takes up this distinction: when the idea 
of original common possession is first introduced (and equated with 
‘commercium’),16 he cautions that a ‘condition of community (communio) of 
what is mine and yours can never be thought to be original but must be 
acquired (by an act that establishes an external right), although possession 
of an external object can originally be only possession in common’ (DoR 
6:258). Similarly, in the section on cosmopolitan right, we are told that the 
members of the original community of land do not stand in a relation of 
‘rightful community of possession (communio) and so of use of it, or of 
property in it; instead they stand in a community of possible physical 
interaction (commercium), that is, in a thoroughgoing relation of each to all 
the others […]’ (DoR 6:352). 
                                                     
16
 This raises the question why, earlier, Kant talks about his conception of original common 
possession as communio fundi originaria. I agree with Byrd and Hruschka’s (2010: 131 fn.45) 
explanation that he possibly uses communio here in order to emphasise the contrast to the 
Grotian notion of communio primaeva that he wants to replace.  
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What Kant seems to argue in these passages is that the global 
community arising from the unavoidable conditions of our existence on 
earth has some kind of priority over contingent, man-made communities of 
right-holders or co-owners linked by juridical relations. Of course, he is not 
suggesting that we should do away with all kinds of particular relations, 
commitments and institutions. 17 Rather, original common possession is 
normatively primordial in the sense that even under conditions where they 
are members of separate political communities, ‘participants still remain 
“originally” participants in “commercium” to the extent that they still retain 
the reflexive capacities to build upon, critique, or revise the terms on which 
they coexist and interact with one another’ (Milstein 2013: 125). What 
motivates Kant’s inversion of the sequence of Grotius’s argument is 
precisely the latter’s tendency to obliterate the global standpoint by 
essentially consolidating existing holdings and borders rather than 
questioning them. Kant’s own model, in contrast, is supposed to provide a 
standpoint from which we can critically reflect on relations of property, 
territory or sovereignty that we have inherited. It allows us to ask in how far 
existing institutions affirm our ability to think ourselves as joint makers of 
the world around us – most importantly, by allowing us to recognize their 
own contingency such that we can take ownership of them – or whether 
they curtail this ability by delimiting possible interaction as well as 
entrenching and naturalising existing separations. To sum up, Kant’s global 
standpoint allows individuals to see themselves as agents of justice that can 
collectively structure and transform their shared social world rather than 
putting up with those terms of interaction that they find themselves in.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In a recent ‘progress report’, Samuel Scheffler (2014) takes stock of three 
decades of global justice theorising. The narrow set of questions, arguments 
and authors that this field proves to centre around somewhat turns the 
                                                     
17
 Compare, for instance, Kant’s reluctance to embrace anything like a world state solution. 
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inventory into a confession to conceptual and theoretical stasis in the 
pertinent debates. The aim of this article was to offer a fundamentally 
different and more systematic way of global theorising, which I take to be 
embodied in Kant’s notion of original common possession. The contrast I 
developed with Grotius’s related notion was not only supposed to illustrate 
Kant’s departure from the natural law tradition, but also how much current 
debates are still caught up in a way of thinking that tends to reduce 
questions of global concern to questions of how to divide the world up. The 
main Kantian challenge to this framework arises from the change in 
perspective from which we think globally: away from the Archimedean 
observer that distributes global shares, to a reflexive first-personal 
standpoint through which agents recognise their unavoidable 
interdependence. This global standpoint does not come with ready-made 
solutions to shared global problems, but provides an alternative perspective 
from which to theorise and negotiate them. What is most appealing about 
the Kantian outlook is its unique and interesting way of framing the 
question how individuals relate to one another globally – emanating from a 
shift in the perspective from which this question arises in the first place. 
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